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JUDGMENTS-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT As To THE APPLICABILITY OF
PENAL STATUTE To THE PLAINTIFF's PROPOSED ACTIVITY DENIED-

Plaintiff was informed by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs of the Federal
Security Agency that its proposed shipments of artificially colored poppy seeds in
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interstate commerce, notwithstanding that they were properly labeled, would be
a violation of the section 402 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,1
and would subject it to the penalty prescribed in that act.2 It thereupon brought
an action against the Federal Security Administration and the Attorney General
for a declaratory judgment that such shipments were not prohibited by the act.
Held, relief denied on the ground that neither of the defendants had threatened
to prosecute the plaintiff or to seize and libel its merchandise, and therefore there
was no justiciable controversy within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Helca, Products Co., Inc. v. McNutt, (Ct. App. D.C. 1943) 137 F. (2d)

681.
To obtain a declaratory judgment plaintiff must show that a justiciable controversy exists. 8 Here he bases his claim that such controversy exists upon two
theories; ( 1) that a specific threat of enforcement is not an absolute condition
precedent to the use of the declaratory judgment when the threat of prosecution
"is implicit in the statute by reason of the civil and criminal sanctions attached
to the statute"; (2) that the declaration by the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs constitutes a threat to enforce the statute because it carries with it the duty
to report such a violation to the Attorney General who has a mandatory duty to
prosecute for violation of the statute. As to the first theory, there is some authority
for the view that the penalty in the statute is threat enough when the plaintiff is
claiming that the statute is unconstitutional; 4 but, when the plaintiff's claim,
as here, is that his proposed activity does not fall within the statutory prohibition,
there must be a threat of enforcement 5 and 2erhaps even that is not enough. 6
52 Stat. L. 1040 at 1046 (1938).
52 Stat. L. 1040 at § 303 (1938): "Any person who violates any of the provisions of section 301 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall on conviction thereof
be subject to imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine of not more than
$1000, or both."
8 Jud. Code§ 274d in 28 U.S.C; (1940) § 400. For a discussion of justiciability
in general, see Borchard, "Jui;ticiability," 4 •uz.ixv. CHI L. REv. I (1936).
4 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15 (1923); in Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N.Y.S. 288 (1936) where plaintiff sought a declaration that city sales tax law was partially void, the court said at p. 293,
" .•• because of the position of peril in which plaintiffs are placed, in view of the civil
and criminal penalties imposed if they fail in their designated duties ••. we consider
that a declaratory judgment is the appropriate remedy.•••" In Acme Finance Co. v.
Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. (2d) 341 (1937) the court gave a declaratory judgment as
to the validity of a statute that had not yet taken effect. Contra, Southern Pacific v.
Conway, (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 746 at 749; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 28 s; Ct. 441 (1907), discussed in 13 L.R.A. (NS) 932 (1908); Ex parte La
Prade, 289 U.S. 444, 53 S. Ct. 682 (1932).
5 Borchard draws an analogy between this case and the case of one seeking a judgment that a proposed activity will not be an infringement of an existing patent. The
courts here require a threat M infringement emanating from patentee to the petitioner
or his customers. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 43 (1941) and cases
cited.
See also id. at 1034 ( l 941) where he says that a businessman cannot obtain a
declaratory judgment to determine the legality of a proposed scheme under the antitrust laws without a threat from the Attorney General, because the department's limited
staff is not available to defend suits selected by private industry.
6 Where the activity is mala in se or a border-line case, such as the inte-rpretation
1
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There is a line of English cases which, on their face, might seem to justify a
declaratory judgment on this theory.7 In Dyson 'ii. Attorney General 8 the
court decided that the penalty in an order of an administrative agency prescnoed
for persons not complying with that order was threat enough upon which to
predicate an action for a declaratory judgment. against the Attorney General.
But those cases may perhaps b~ distinguished from the instant case ip that the
punishment in the Dyson case was to be enforced against those who did not fill
in the prescribed forms, of whom the plaintiff was admittedly one, while in the
principal case the punishment was to be enforced against persons doing what the
act prohibited, a class to which the plaintiff claimed he did not belong. As to the
second theory, the court held that the declaration of the commission fell far short
of a threat by either defe'ndant, because neither of them was necessarily obliged to
agree with the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, but was free to use his own
judgment and discretion. In any event, the plaintiff should first have proceeded
to exhaust his administrative remedies as prescribed by the statute 11 before seeking any judicial relief.10
Mary. lane Plumer

of a gambling statute, the courts are less ready to permit the plaintiff to adjudicate his
rights under the declaratory judgment acts. Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E.
(2d) 814 (1937). State ex rel. Egan v. Superior Court of Lake County, 211 Ind. 303,
6 N.E. (2d) 945 (1937).
.
7 Dyson v. Attorney General, [19u] 1 K.B. 410, [1912] l Ch. 158; Burghes
v. Attorney General, [1911] 2 Ch. 139, [1912] I Ch. 173: Colonial Sugar Refining
Co. v. Attorney General for the Commonwealth, (Aust. High Ct. 1912) 15 Com.
L. R. 182.
·
8 [19u] I K.B. 410, (i91z] I Ch. 158.
9 The statute provides in 21 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1943) § 335: "Before any violation
of this chapter is reported by the Administrator to any United States attorney for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated
shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views, either orally
or in writing, with regard to such contemplated proceeding."
'
10 In Gully v. Inter-state Nat. Gas. Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 145 at
148 the court said that the plaintiff must pursue the remedies given him under the act
questioned before he could resort to a federal equity court. In accord, City of South
Bend v. Marckle, 215 Ind. 74, 18 N.E. (2d) 764 at 769 (1939); Meredith v. Carter,
(D.C. Ind. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 899, abstracted in 42 M1cH. L. REv. 190-191 (1943);
Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat. Bituminous Coal Co., (App. Ct. D.C. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 426.
But Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N.Y.S. 288
(1936) seems contra.

